

[REDACTED]

[1] This is an interlocutory matter for the condonation of the late filing of heads of argument and bundle of authorities by the appellant, the applicant herein. The appeal arises from the judgment of the High Court delivered on 30 September 2020 by the learned NMJ [redacted] on [redacted] as a point of law. The High Court [redacted] because that the applicant/appealant [redacted] is essentially directed to the Chair of the [redacted] Commission (respondent) and the Teaching Service Commission [redacted] that it has no original jurisdiction to determine [redacted]

[2] [redacted] that [redacted] had previously noted an appeal [redacted] the need to file heads in attendance with the [redacted] had [redacted] on the 1st of February 2021 [redacted] of his/her [redacted] professional [redacted] as stated in [redacted]

“ [redacted] Head [redacted] which [redacted] to my most open [redacted] [redacted] of the professional assistants to prepare the Heads of Arguments on or about the 5th of February 2021

"11. The Heads were duly prepared and I signed them on the 11th February 2021 and I was of the idea that by the time of drafting this application the Heads were long served and filed...."

"12. I therefore humbly submit that I was taken aback to receive a Notice to Dismiss the Appeal from 4th respondent on the 2nd March 2021. That was when I learnt that the heads [redacted] were timeously prepared had not been served."

"13....This I humbly submit as an oversight on [redacted] part as an office and I humbly apply that the Court [redacted] such".

[3] Mr. Howe further deposed on behalf of the applicant averring that applicant had "great prospects of success on the merits in this matter [redacted] a matter of public interest bearing upon a constitutional issue pertaining to the [redacted] of office and appointment of a public officer, the second respondent. Interpretation [redacted] 75 of the Constitution is material issue to be determined by the Court. The outcome of the matter will put to rest once and for all the tenor (sic) of office of all chairmen [redacted] of the Public Service Commissions like the 2nd Respondent," who, it was [redacted], "occupies office unconstitutionally". It was further asserted that the High Court [redacted] finding that it had no jurisdiction since the matter involved a section of the Constitution. In the result, the merits of the matter were not disposed of by the Court *a quo*. [redacted] submit that the above Honourable Court should find sufficient cause for condonation [redacted] the filing of Heads of Arguments" as applicant has high prospects of success, the applicant [redacted] erred. There is also a cross-appeal which points to the respondent as also eager to [redacted] matter disposed of on merits, further asserted Mr. Howe.

[4] As part of this condonation application, the applicant has attached the 'notice of appeal' in the main matter. The applicant asserts that the main matter is "purely constitutional in nature" and that the Court *a quo* erred in holding that the matter was labour-related involving employment contracts and recognition agreement between the parties. Instead, the deponent avers, the matter involves the clarification of the meaning

and application of section 175 of the Constitution, and if the 3rd respondent is not legally constituted, its operations may be challengeable. This shows that the matter is constitutional and calls for determination. Be it stated that if applicant is successful the matter may have to return to the High Court for determination on merits. Whether the matter is a live issue or merely academic would be for the High Court to decide.

[5] The application is strenuously opposed by the respondents, notwithstanding their cross-appeal to the effect that the Court *a quo* erred by “*not dealing with the merits of the respondents’ defence which would have seen a complete dismissal of the appellant’s claim*”.

[6] The threshold defence is that the matter is academic and as such evinces no prospects of success. To this end, Legal Notice No. 10 of 2019 is attached, effecting appointments to the 3rd respondent. The matter is considered by the Court *a quo*. Various other points on merits are taken up by the respondents. I do not think we need to fully consider these arguments. If the condition succeeds this Court would have to decide as part of the appeal whether the High Court was correct in declining jurisdiction.

[7] In paragraph 11 Mr. Howe says that the heads of argument were signed on 11th February 2021. But he has no idea why those heads were not filed with the Court, only to be alerted by the notice of 4th Respondent on 2 March 2021 to have the appeal struck off the roll. What happened between signing the heads on 11 February and 26 February, when the heads were supposed to have been served is not explained; it’s a blank. This raises the question whether the heads were ever timeously prepared and signed as deponent alleges; or, whether the matter is sufficiently important in the estimation of the deponent. Indeed, the fact that the matter of the heads had been left to an assistant also raises the very issue of the alleged importance of the matter as Mr. Simelane argued. The applicant must disabuse the Court of any reasonable notion that the heads were probably not prepared on time. One would have thought that once the heads were signed the next instruction was to have them filed. Not to have given this instruction, or if given, not to have followed up the

entire due compliance, was grossly negligent on the part of Mr. Howe. Mr. Howe's busy work schedule is no excuse for non-compliance with the Rules of Court.

[8] In paragraphs 16 and 17, the learned Judge *a quo* stated:

"[16].... (A)nd, [redacted] made an issue of the appointment [redacted] position of the 3rd Respondent.

"17. It is common to [redacted] a labour-related dispute because of the [redacted] that exists [redacted] in the parties and which is still in force [redacted] between the two parties [redacted] a labour-related dispute because the applicant [redacted] testing and / or challenge [redacted] the appointment of the 3rd Respondent whose [redacted] surely is an occurrence or grievance which [redacted] the employment and / or labour relations between the [redacted] being [redacted] and the employee, being the applicant".

[9] The learned Judge *a quo* also [redacted] the 3rd respondent exercises disciplinary functions over [redacted], for instance. It should be noted however that disciplinary [redacted] over individual teachers who happen [redacted] be members of [redacted] difference between individual members [redacted]

[10] Central to an [redacted] cause has been established for the Court to condone [redacted] court to decide whether a proper explanation has been advanced and the respondent's attitude cannot bind this Court"¹ and "It is for the applicant to satisfy this Court that there is sufficient cause for excusing him from compliance, and the fact [redacted] the respondent has no objection,

although not irrelevant, is by no means an overriding consideration”². Holmes JA in **Melane**³ had this to say:

“In deciding whether a cause has been shown, the basic principle is that the Court has a discretion exercised judicially upon a consideration of all the facts, and in essence it is a matter of fairness to both sides. Among the facts usually relevant are the degree of later explanation therefor, the prospects of success, and the importance of the case. Ordinarily, the facts are interrelated; they are not individually decisive, for that would be a piece-meal approach incompatible with a true discretion, save of course, that if there are no prospects of success there would be no point in granting condonation.....What is needed is a conspectus of all the facts”

[11] In argument before this Court Mr. Howe referred to paragraphs 18 and 20 of his affidavit and showing the existence of prospects of success the respondents stand to suffer no prejudice by the condonation being granted. It is averred as follows:

“18 I humbly submit that we have great prospects on the merits in this matter as it is a matter of public interest because of a constitutional issue pertaining to the tenor (sic) of office and appointment of an officer, the second respondent. Interpretation of Section 175 of the Constitution is a material issue to be determined by the Court. The outcome of this matter will rest once and for all the tenor (sic) of all chairman (sic) of the Public Service Commissions like 2nd Respondent.

“19. It is therefore submitted that the balance of convenience favours the granting of the condonation hence the hearing of the Appeal. On the merits it will be submitted that the 2nd Respondent occupies office unconstitutionally. There is also

a cross-appeal in the very matter wherefore the desire on both parties to have the matter heard is very high.

“20. The Court gave also weight in its finding that it had no jurisdiction to hear the matter and [redacted] of the appointments [redacted] such with and brought to finality [redacted] institution and develop it as the [redacted]”

“22. [redacted] of success. [redacted] that the Court has the jurisdiction to [redacted] consider [redacted]”

[12] With regards to the force of the arguments by [redacted] half of the applicant, I would agree with him that the matter [redacted] some public [redacted] as such important. But is that enough to win the Court's condonation of [redacted] compliance? The importance of the matter is one of the factors to be taken into [redacted] in the process of the search for the sufficient cause which is a product of [redacted] (conspectus) set out by leading Judges in this field. It will be noted [redacted] a matter does not represent 'prospects of success'. It is rather [redacted] scales in favour of granting or not granting condonation. [redacted] set out on their own and be not confused with the importance [redacted] case.

[13] As often happens in the many [redacted] for condonation [redacted] are invariably cited in which it is pointed out that [redacted] success have [redacted] or alleged at all. But what form the expected process must take has not been indicated by the opponents of the applications. [redacted] applicant stands seriously challenged in showing prospects of success short of straying into the merits which may or may not prove successful in the appeal. *In casu* Mr. Simelane has boldly stated in the respondents' heads of arguments: “4. *The applicant has failed to state their prospects of success in the matter. To simply argue that this matter is of national interest and the Court must interpret and*

guide the board appointments made...⁽⁴⁾ without stating how they are wrong in the founding affidavit does [REDACTED] then made to paragraphs 18 to 20 cited above. It needs to be pointed out that in their very nature prospects of success can never be specific or [REDACTED] speak to something which has not yet happened – as I have said short of data on merits which is the subject for the appeal. What is required of the applicant is an efficiently high-level analysis of the aspects of the case which purportedly supports or [REDACTED] all support [REDACTED]. There does not have to be many prospects, one solid prospect [REDACTED] But prospects alone, are not necessarily decisive if they are part of a [REDACTED]

[14] Mr. Simelane also cited the [REDACTED] *Motshwa*⁵ and referred to what has been termed the ‘two main legal requirements for granting an application for condonation’ namely that “*the applicant must present a plausible explanation for the delay in complying with the Rules of Court*” and [REDACTED] the Court that he has prospects of success on the merits”. These ‘two main legal requirements’ however, are like a mute or silent movie. They must be made to talk [REDACTED] so to see how they apply or fail to apply in any given situation. As a [REDACTED] the learned Chief Justice was correct. But life must be breathed into the [REDACTED] Simelane has not been helpful in this regard. The same is also true of the [REDACTED] *Janes Hlatshwayo*⁶ case at paragraph 17. To some extent, the latter case [REDACTED]. The degree of delay and the prospects of success are [REDACTED] the plausibility of the reasons for the delay or non-compliance [REDACTED] of the Court to [REDACTED] respondent’s interest in the finality of the judgment [REDACTED] not be properly represented by the applicant who may be the appellant. It must [REDACTED] be the respondent. Further, the Court has a discretion to [REDACTED] judicially in evaluating [REDACTED] determine the presence or otherwise of the [REDACTED]. In all this and throughout the entire process, there is

⁴ It is important that in Court or in controversial situations His Majesty’s name should be avoided as far as it may be practicable.

nothing really hard and fast. A degree of flexibility must be sustained if the Rules of Court are not to be made hard to operate with consummate effect.

[15] Generally speaking, the respondent has an interest in the finality of the judgment he has in his favour which the appellant seeks to disturb. That is why Mr. Simelane so soon after 26 February applied to have the judgment struck off. Thus respondent's interest is also a factor to be taken into account for the sufficient cause. In *Cairns' Executors v Gaarn*⁷ In re *Wainwright* (1912) 180 S.C. 180, the following passage appears:

*"With regard to the application for the judgment to be struck off, I think it can be properly taken to mean that the court has a discretion to be used in a wider sense, as compared with the ordinary case, in granting relief from the operation of the rules. The circumstances are so special in their nature that the court feel bound to assist the applicant. The court has a discretion, though it is not a discretion, and its cause must always be imposed upon the court. It is to be considered in arriving at a conclusion. The court has framed an exhaustive definition of what would constitute sufficient cause to justify the grant of indulgence. Any attempt to restrict the court's discretion of a discretion which the rules have put in its power is very extensive, and it is highly desirable not to abridge. All that is required is that the applicant must show, in the words of Cotton LJ (*In re M'Call's Estate*), 'something which entitles him to the indulgence of the court. Something is something is must be decided upon the facts of the case."*

[16] But the decision must be made on the merits of the application passes muster. This case is somehow unique. The heads of argument were due for filing on or before 26 February. On

5 February Mr. Howe instructs a professional assistant to prepare the heads which Mr. Howe later approves and signs, but somehow omits giving the instruction to have the heads promptly filed with the Registrar. And further omits to follow up to ensure that the filing has been duly done. Lo and behold, by due date, that is, 26 February, the heads were still not filed contrary to the Rules. There can be no doubt that the applicant by its attorney was very negligent. There simply is no explanation why the heads were forgotten from being filed and served. In other words, the explanation Mr. Howe has tendered falls far too short such that even taking into account the prospects of success on appeal and the alleged importance of the matter, the applicant has not been established. This case is made even more difficult by the fact that the applicant was only alerted to the missed filing by the Notice to Dismiss or Strike off the appeal at the instance of the respondent. That makes the case very bad for the applicant. On the face of it, the non-compliance may be said to be slight when measured by the time of the application for condonation. The reality however is that applicant was not aware that it had not filed its heads and that time had run out. That was a disaster on the part of the applicant and it is not to be condoned.

[17] We must then look at the facts of the particular case before the Court. Pertinently, the question is whether the applicant has set out in the four grounds of appeal anything or better still, something which entitles the applicant to ask for the indulgence of the Court. As has been shown, the applicant inadvertently missed the date for filing its heads of argument. In my view, mere forgetfulness cannot be used to justify failure to comply with the Rules of Court since every other defaulting litigant might be minded to do the same and similarly.

[18] The long and short of this application is that good and sufficient cause has not been established by the applicant to justify the exercise of the Court's indulgence in its favour. In the result the following order is made –

1. The application for condonation is dismissed with costs.
2. The appeal is struck off the roll not to be reinstated without leave of Court.

